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D o s s i e r
On 16 May 2016 Russia’s leading investigative 
newspaper Novaya Gazeta published an article 
on the suicides of teenagers across the Russian 
Federation. The article entitled “The Groups of 
Death” claimed that the Russian social network 
VKontakte contained a myriad of groups for teen-
agers that brainwashed young people and pushed 
them to commit suicide. According to the author, 
around 130 teenagers died between November 
2015 and April 2016 and they were all members 
of the same communities which were managed by 
anonymous “puppet masters” that created tasks 
for teenagers and set the dates of their suicides.1
As of July 2017, the article has been accessed 
by approximately 3.5 millions Internet users, a 
response that has triggered heated debates and 
legislative amendments. Galina Mursalieva, the 
author of the piece, has released a book based on 
the article that has promoted the alarmist argu-
ment that the Internet is dangerous for Russian 
teenagers.2 However, what strikes the reader 
about the original text is the strong conspiratorial 
spirit that frames the main argument of the article 
and how key conspiracy theories are for the con-
struction of the public issue: the teenage suicides 
and the growing influence of the Internet. The 
author triggers moral panics around the Internet. 
She demands the law enforcement agencies to 
intervene and close the “suicidal” groups, arrest 
the founders and protect young people from the 
powerful, faceless forces. Still, the argument 
in which these conspiratorial allegations are 
couched lacks any internal logic, and they are 
criticized by fellow journalists who accuse the 
media outlet of a tremendous lack of professional-
ism and an endorsement of conspiracy theories. 
What has triggered this debate, why has a fierce 
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argument divided the professional community 
and what can be learnt from this case about the 
Russian media environment?
The Mystery of Russian Teenage Suicides
“This text has to be read by ALL PARENTS” 
Mursalieva declares in the introduction to her 
piece. The lead of the article states: “[Somebody] 
is systematically and consistently working with 
young people on social networks, pushing them 
over the edge.”3 The bottom line of the piece: 
Russian social networks are full of secret commu-
nities managed by anonymous villains that draw 
children into role play games that are supposed 
to end in suicide.
Mursalieva is known for her alarmist attacks 
against the Internet. In her 2006 book she argued 
that the Internet is fatally dangerous for Russian 
youngsters.4 However, the new article in May 
2016 has attracted more readers. Mursalieva’s 
argument has also seriously evolved and adopted 
clearly conspiratorial features. It has embraced 
the notion that anonymous adults, who control 
the Internet, manage the online groups and indoc-
trinate teenagers to commit suicide. After joining 
these groups youngsters play online games that 
step by step draw them ever deeper into group 
chat where teenagers must answer questions 
and decipher mysteries. Parents are not able to 
comprehend how these networks operate and 
what their children are discussing and therefore 
they struggle to understand what is happening to 
them. Some parents and the author see the social 
networks as a weird amalgam of signs, strange 
words and references to various religious cults 
and sects.
At the final stage of this game teenagers are given 
50 days before committing suicide. According to 
the author and the mother of Angelina Davydova 
her daughter had shown no signs of depression 
or mental illness before suicide. After Angelina’s 
death her mother explored these “groups of 
death” and discovered that at the final stages of 
the game teenagers are asked to wake up at 4:20 in 
the morning and look for the meaning of strange 
symbols. Mursalieva writes: “That is a vulgar 
manipulation of ideas and invented symbols, that 
were turned into a meme by the unknown pup-
pet masters. In a nutshell, it’s rubbish. However, 
youngsters who sleep only half the night… take 
it for granted.”5
The article claims that the online campaign to 
provoke teenage suicide began with the death of a 
certain Rina from Ussuriisk, a Russian city in the 
Far East. Her photo after the suicide, according to 
the author and her interviewees, has been spread 
in these “suicide groups” deliberately. Her mother 
claimed that the day of her daughter’s death was 
set by “someone” and that she had been given the 
order to commit suicide by phone. All contribu-
tors to discussion about these “suicide groups” 
note that for their now-dead children, the photo 
of Rina became an icon that was quickly spread 
around numerous groups by the very same people 
who had killed their children.
The conclusion of the article is straightforward: 
the admins of online communities are petty 
criminals who work for the benefit of an unknown 
and invisible “Devil”. Russian parents are deal-
ing with a well-designed mechanism to destroy 
young people, one that brainwashes their children 
and relentlessly pushes them to suicide. In her 
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article, Mursalieva included a map of Russia 
with strange symbols that show the cities which 
the alleged anonymous organizers of the teenage 
suicides have picked for future teenage deaths. 
In a fashion traditional for conspiracy theorists, 
Mursalieva has decoded the map and figured 
out the cities where the next suicides are to take 
place. The author has demanded that the law en-
forcement agencies act rapidly to prevent future 
suicides; this demand has been supported by the 
“expert opinions”. Two experts, one of whom 
turned out to be the author’s son, a psycholo-
gist by training, called for an amendment of the 
criminal law to introduce harsher punishment for 
incitement to suicide and harsher policies against 
the online groups.
As mentioned earlier, the article in Novaya 
Gazeta sparked a wave of television shows and 
publications that set off a moral panic of a con-
spiratorial nature around social networks. The 
main frame of discussion, orchestrated by the 
state media and in online space, has disparaged 
the Internet as a sphere of communication and 
a social phenomenon. It is an uncontrollable 
space that endangers Russian children who can’t 
resist the manipulation of anonymous “puppet 
masters”. 
“Russians are suffering genocide”: the 
conspiratorial framing of the Russian Internet
As Jack Bratich argued, conspiracy panics – 
precisely the phenomenon witnessed during the 
discussed debate – open the portal to understand-
ing the political rationality behind the social and 
political phenomena of conspiracy theories.6 It is 
important to note that it is not correct to view con-
spiracy theories as the tool of crackpots. Current 
scholarship has already established that they are 
an important way of discussing societal problems. 
It is a reaction to a changing landscape of social 
interaction that puts a person in a situation in 
which his/her life could be endangered by more 
powerful actors whose abilities to destroy life 
through several clicks is hard to underestimate. 
Uscinsky & Parent contend, conspiracy theories 
are a manifestation of the vulnerability of a cer-
tain social group that – by spreading conspiracy 
theories – launches an “early warning system for 
group security.”7
Given the intensity of the campaign against “the 
groups of deaths”, the first important observation 
to be made relates to the suspicions that some 
Russians have towards the Internet and new 
technologies.
When we come to the question of urban legends 
and moral panics, “the Internet” as a concept and 
space is treated by scholars in a contradictory 
way. As a space, the Internet seems to be a forum 
ideal for spreading folklore and oral history.8 
It is used for studying different social groups 
representations and narratives and how various 
stories spread there.9 In addition, the Internet has 
been considered as a springboard for conspiracy 
theories.10 The Internet itself is a subject of these 
legends and histories: it is an interpretation of a 
dystopian view of technologies that can be traced 
back to the beginnings of industrialization. As a 
technology, the Internet is anticipated either to 
bring about some social good, such as democ-
racy or equality or, on the contrary, to encourage 
autocracy, filter bubbles or to provide a space for 
uncontrolled content or business.11 
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The Internet is also an integral part of urban 
legend that has a special resonance when it relates 
to children online-practices: teenagers and chil-
dren are not fully grasped by adults. Children’s 
digital rights and their safety are one of the key 
issues for studies of the Internet and childhood. 
The main threats to youngsters that are discussed 
in such context are pornography, sex between 
teenagers and Internet addiction.12 
In that context, the case of anxiety about “the 
groups of deaths” embraces both these Internet 
roles. Firstly, it is social networks that serve as 
the field for gathering folklore and interpreta-
tions about the moral panic about teenagers’ 
suicides. Secondly, the Internet itself as a social 
phenomenon is blamed for drawing youngsters 
into suicide. 
However, the danger that the Internet poses to 
the Russian authorities in their struggle to con-
trol civil activity is another way of discussing 
the conspiratorial wave of conceptualizations of 
social networks. 
It is worth noting that in the 2000s the Kremlin 
regularly deployed anti-Western conspiracy 
theories as a major tool of social cohesion and 
nation building.13 Starting from 2004, when the 
authorities realized the threat of the color revolu-
tions to the smooth transfer of power from Putin 
to a successor, anti-Western conspiracy theories 
were deployed to ruin legitimacy of Vladimir 
Putin’s potential rivals, both inside the country 
and abroad,14 and to justify the gradual authoritar-
ian turn. The constant fear of the Western intru-
sion in the Russian politics had become a major 
paradigm to interpret domestic and international 
developments. The Kremlin assisted the promo-
tion of numerous public intellectuals whose aim 
was to spread the fears of the Western plot among 
the Russians, and, thereby, it helped the Kremlin 
keep the society under control. The Internet, as 
the freest of all spheres of Russian society in the 
late Putin’s Russia, has inevitably become a major 
target of repressions.   
In the 2000s and especially in the 2010s the 
Russian authorities have made many attempts 
to place the online sphere under tight control.15 
The conspiratorial perception of the Internet is 
not new to Russia and as the Russian elites have 
steadily fallen out of favour since 2011 (also as 
the result of online campaigns by the opposition), 
a conspiratorial reading of the Internet has been 
gaining more prominence among the political 
elites. In 2014 President Vladimir Putin famously 
called the Internet a “CIA invention” that should 
be restricted in those countries that fight against 
American information domination.16 The acti-
vity of the Russian opposition online has caused 
several major waves of limitations imposed 
on users of the Internet by Kremlin deputies.17 
Hence, by the mid-2010s the media sphere has 
become largely controlled by the government to 
prevent any further social and political mobili-
zation organized online. In the last several years 
state-affiliated political, security, and media 
elites have penetrated online space, and the role 
of online space for agenda setting and activism 
has decreased.18
Analysis of the media discussion triggered by the 
Novaya gazeta article reveals that the conspirato-
rial pattern chosen by the Russian state-run and 
state-aligned media deploys conspiracy theories 
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as a tool to delegitimize the Internet and to 
present social networks as launching an “informa-
tion war” against Russia. As Mark Fenster noted, 
conspiracy theories can be a powerful tool with 
which to delegitimize political opponents for they 
act as slanderous labellization and the means to 
rally support by creating identities. According to 
Fenster, conspiracy theories possess an important 
communicative function; they help unite the 
audience as “the people” against the imagined 
“Other” represented by the secretive “ower bloc” 
This method had already been employed several 
times by the Kremlin to solve the political crisis 
and promote its authoritarian agenda.19 No sur-
prise that the case of the “groups of death” was 
realized in a similar fashion. 
Media discussion around “the groups of deaths” 
has revolved around two main topics constantly 
promoted by the pro-Kremlin speakers, that 
helped spreading the fears of the Internet and 
justify further legislative restrictions. 
First, state-aligned television companies launched 
several programs that promoted a conspiratorial 
reading of online communities. The controversial 
deputy and anti-LGBT activist Vitalii Milonov 
called the alleged suicide groups the tool of in-
formation warfare against Russia. According to 
him, the group suicide of teenagers orchestrated 
by “puppet masters” could have triggered panic 
in the country and undermined the legitimacy 
of a government which was unable to protect its 
citizens.20
In the documentary “Where does childhood go?”, 
the television channel NTV argued that Ukrainian 
hackers are behind “the groups of deaths” – a 
curious twist in the anti-Ukrainian campaign 
of previous years.21 A series of talk shows on 
television’s Channel One consistently developed 
the Ukrainian motive behind the anti-Russian 
conspiracy. One of the guests – an activist in 
the pro-Kremlin “e League of Secure Internet”– 
reiterated the fear that online groups are a mode of 
information warfare against Russians.22 The next 
show on the topic demonstrated the presenters’
interest in further promoting a conspiratorial 
reading of the story. Both presenters of the show 
gave considerable time to guests who claimed that 
online groups have been established by Ukrainian 
hackers and have penetrated all Russian comput-
ers. The anti-Ukrainian stance has been much 
welcomed and endorsed. Here, conspiratorial 
statements service social mobilization in support 
of the government in its attempts to protect the 
Russian people from foreign online insurgents 
and use the Ukrainian conflict to put the Internet 
space under its tight control.
Second, participants in the debate have called 
for harsher punishment for incitement to suicide 
that should specifically include online incitement. 
This amendment must be effected immediately to 
prevent individuals, allegedly controlled by evil 
“puppet masters”, from meddling in the Russian 
online sphere and “conspiring” against Russian 
youth.23 Accordingly, conspiratorial notions 
have been used to legitimize severe measures 
against online activists who could endorse the 
anti-government ideas.
It is worth noting that the topic of young peoples’ 
suicides had been brought up in 2012 and that it 
also received a fair amount of coverage on the 
major state television channels. Discussions on 
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these talk shows did not interpret the teenage 
suicides as the consequence of a “malign con-
spiracy”. Back then the argument was completely 
different: young people’s addiction to computers 
resulted from a lack of parental control.24 Hence, 
the dominance of the conspiratorial framing of 
the Internet in 2016-2017 may be attributed to the 
increase in the Kremlin’s demand to legitimize 
its authoritarian legislation.
The public discussion in the media that was pro-
voked by the Novaya gazeta article reflected both 
public anxiety about the growing role of the new 
technologies in day to day life and the govern-
ment’s concern about social mobilization via the 
Internet. Supported by state-produced narratives 
and spread by state-aligned media, conspiratorial 
notions have been a well-designed instrument to 
justify state intervention in the online sphere. In 
March 2017 Vladimir Putin publicly approved 
amendment to legislation regarding the Internet 
and the State Parliament has passed new, harsher 
legislation, seemingly the result of the discussed 
media campaign triggered by the respected inves-
tigative newspaper.25 In the 2000s and the 2010s 
especially Russian authorities very often em-
barked upon conspiratorial ideas to promote their 
policies and achieve public mobilization.26Given 
the nature of the media campaign against social 
networks framed by conspiratorial ideas, the 
legislative changes were just a matter of time.  
There was, however, another question in this 
affair: why did one of the best investigative 
newspapers allow such controversial material to 
be published? 
Professional ethics and journalism in Russia: 
the case of Novaya gazeta 
The answer is to be found in the dramatic lack 
of ethical principles in the Russian journalist 
community. The article by Novaya gazeta had 
no argument and no hard evidence of who (if 
anyone at all) stood behind the teenage suicides. 
The research suggests that in the post-Soviet 
period, the Russian journalistic community has 
failed to establish the professional norms of a 
community where journalists can operate as gate-
keepers, preventing the proliferation of unverified 
materials. Professional journalistic norms – such 
as transparent sources, reputation, professional 
solidarity, evidence-based argument – should 
protect the mainstream from conspiratorial alle-
gations.27 It is safe to argue that nowadays ethical 
standards are a rare beast in Russian journalism. 
The number of outlets which follow the rules and 
fulfil the role of gatekeeper is very small. In the 
Russian context, journalists attempted but failed 
to create and promote ethical guidelines among 
colleagues.28 On the contrary, the majority of both 
rank-and-file and elite Russian journalists, as well 
as media managers, prefer to work without any 
guidelines; this allows them to successfully toe 
the line of the government and release reports 
and articles that both entertain and create a fram-
ing of events and personalities demanded by the 
Kremlin or the owners of media outlets.29 This 
has resulted from various factors: the pressure 
of the media owners, the repressive measures of 
the Kremlin in the 2000s, as well as the absence 
of professional ethics in the Soviet journalism.   
The discussed article revealed this gap and 
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highlighted a curious fact: Novaya gazeta, as a 
leading Russian investigative publication that 
often unveils the crimes of the Putin regime, had 
played in the hands of the Kremlin triggering a 
moral panic that eventually allowed the Kremlin 
to promote anti-democratic legislation. Another 
Russian media outlet, Meduza – exceptional in 
following ethical guidelines – questioned the 
professionalism of the author of Novaya gazeta, 
which caused the conflict to escalate further. 
It argued that the piece dramatically lacked an 
unbiased character. 30
Meduza, which is known for its strict internal 
guidelines and rigorous work on its material 
had gained the status of the uncompromised 
beacon of professional ethics; it is this stance 
that has forced its team to relocate to Latvia to 
avoid Russian state pressure in 2014. In con-
trast, Novaya gazeta operates in a much more 
complicated Russian media environment and in 
order to survive, its media management has had 
to cooperate with the law enforcement agencies; 
and it doesn’t have clear professional guidelines 
that allow it to avoid or minimize conflicts with 
the Kremlin.31 Journalistic investigation of the 
publication revealed that some junior members 
of Novaya gazeta’s staff have confessed to their 
interviewees that they have close connections 
with the law enforcement agencies, who have 
forced them to divulge information.32
All in all, the lack of professional guidelines and 
the ability to promote any possible material, even 
if the facts it is based on can hardly be verified, 
serves as a springboard for conspiracy theories in 
Russia. Such lack of principles opens the gates to 
conspiracy theories that in the unhealthy media 
environment of Putin’s Russia serves as a useful 
tool for social mobilization and a way to legiti-
mize Kremlin policies. In this particular case, the 
story about “the groups of death”, well-written, 
emotional and appealing to millions of Russian 
families, triggered public discussion in the media 
and was used by the Kremlin signified as a grass 
roots initiative to justify further limitations on 
the Internet.
The fact of publication in a respected investiga-
tive newspaper demonstrates that even critically 
thinking professionals are vulnerable to con-
spiratorial thinking. This crucial lack of principles 
allows Russian journalists to spread conspiracy 
theories in the media without any professional 
or reputational consequence. It helps journalists 
to avoid conflicts with the Kremlin, but, on the 
other hand, it affects millions of Russian citizens 
whose reliance on the media is very high, which 
in turns triggers the moral panic about the new 
technologies. This not only shapes the national 
discourse around the Internet but it indirectly 
helps the government to further curtail freedom 
of speech.
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En mai 2016, un important journal russe, Novaya 
Gazeta, a publié un long article d’investigation in-
titulé « Les groupes de la mort » traitant de groupes 
publics sur le réseau social russe Vkontakte ciblant les 
adolescents et les encourageant au suicide. L’auteur y 
prétendait que les jeunes Russes étaient tués par une 
force inconnue qui « tirait les ficelles » de l’internet. 
Cet article déclencha un large débat public autour 
des dangers de l’internet pour les jeunes Russes qui 
déboucha sur l’appel à l’enfermement des fondateurs 
de ces groupes ainsi qu’une modification législative 
permettant de poursuivre quiconque encouragerait, 
favoriserait ou aiderait un suicide. Rapidement, le débat 
s’est focalisé sur la sphère de l’éthique journalistique 
dans la mesure où l’auteur des « Groupes de la mort » se 
vit accusé de violer les règles éthiques du journalisme 
d’investigation et de propager la peur des nouvelles 
technologies parmi la population russe. D’une part, la 
parution de cet article dans un journal d’investigation 
respecté démontre que même parmi des professionnels 
capables de réflexions critiques, certains sont vulné-
rables à la pensée conspirationniste. Non seulement 
ceci alimente le discours national alarmiste à propos de 
l’internet, mais, en outre, ceci favorise indirectement 
les velléités gouvernementales de couper court à la 
liberté d’expression. D’autre part, la focalisation du 
débat autour de sphère éthique a permis de souligner 
le manque de principes professionnels qui permet aux 
journalistes russes de propager des théories du complot 
en toute impunité professionnelle ou réputationnelle.
Abstract
In May 2016, a leading Russian newspaper Novaya 
Gazeta published a long investigative piece entitled 
“The Groups of Death” about public groups in the 
Russian social network VKontakte which allegedly 
target teenagers and encourage them to commit 
suicide. The author claimed that Russian youngsters 
were being killed by an unknown force that remotely 
“pulls the strings” on the Internet. The article triggered 
a massive public debate about the danger of the 
Internet for young Russians and called for the founders 
of these groups imprisoned and legislation amended to 
prosecute anyone who tries to encourage, aid and abet 
suicide. The debate quickly escalated into the sphere 
of professional journalistic ethics: the author of “the 
groups of deaths” pieces was accused of violating the 
ethical norms of journalistic investigation and thus 
spreading fear of technological progress among ordi-
nary Russians. On the one hand, the fact of publication 
in a respected investigative newspaper demonstrates 
that even critically thinking professionals are vulne-
rable to conspiratorial thinking. This not only shapes 
the alarmist national discourse around the Internet but 
it indirectly helps the government to further curtail 
freedom of speech. On the other hand, the escalation of 
the debate to the sphere of ethics uncovers the lack of 
professional principles that allows Russian journalists 
to spread conspiracy theories without any professional 
or reputational reprimand.
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